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Abstract:  
In this work, we propose a coopetitive model applied to the Greek crisis, aimed both at improving the 
competitiveness of the Greek productive system and rebalancing the current account balance of the country. 
Our model of coopetition (based on normal form game theory) is conceived at a macro level, wherein 
there are two players: Greece and SNC (the Surplus Northern Countries of the euro area). We suggest a model 
that looks for a win-win solution. The win-win solution entails a cooperative bi-strategy in which SNC should 
contribute to re-balance its trade surplus with respect to Greece and, in addition, SNC should provide a certain 
amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) to improve the competitiveness and the growth in Greece. Thus we 
find a transferable utility and properly coopetitive solution, convenient for all the players. 
Keywords: Games and economics; coopetition, cooperation, competitiveness; trade balance; foreign direct 
investment; Greek economy. 
JEL Classification: C71, C72, C78, F2, F23, F42, O24 
1. Introduction  
How can we help Greece to find solutions to overcome or, at least, improve its economy, 
which is still suffering from a deep crisis since 2010? Which policy actions can be taken within the 
euro system to make the Greek economy more competitive and steer the country towards a path of 
sustainable economic growth? The austerity measures imposed by the European authorities and the 
IMF to Greece revealed their limits, determining a long and deep recession and making the recovery 
very problematic, as Mussa (2010) had already foreseen. In this work we devise a coopetitive model 
aimed both at rebalancing the current account balance of Greece and make its productive system more 
competitive. So, we propose a model that looks for a win-win solution. This model, based on normal 
form game theory and conceived at a macro level, aims at suggesting feasible solutions in a 
coopetitive perspective for the divergent interests, which drive the economic policies of the countries 
in the euro area. 
In the model we consider only two players: Greece and the Northern Countries of the euro 
area in surplus (SNC), namely: Germany, Austria, France, Finland, Netherlands and Luxembourg. In 
fact, since 2008, these latter countries have become much more competitive than the Southern 
countries of the euro area (Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy), thus these Northern countries have 
obtained large current account surpluses. In our model the win-win solution entails that SNC should 
contribute to re-balance its trade surplus with respect to Greece. 
In addition, SNC should provide a certain amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) that can 
improve the competitiveness of Greek economy, FDI may also become an important part of a new 
strategy of growth in Greece because of its spillover effects. This economic policy strategy based on 
coopetition pursued by SNC and Greece is convenient for both since it will help to make the euro area 
a financially stable region; in addition the improved competitiveness of Greece will favor its growth 
and this will benefit SNC as well. We are indeed aware that this model is built on some special 
assumptions, though not unrealistic, so our analytical framework of coopetition represents a partial 
and possible way out of the economic crisis that hits the Greek economy. 
2.  Greece, its crisis and the strategy based on coopetition 
Greece is still suffering a deep and lasting economic crisis. The rates of changes of its real 
GDP in the last three years, 2011, 2012, 2013, have been heavily negative, respectively -7.1%,  -6.4 
per cent, - 4.2 per cent (Eurostat, 2013). All this demonstrates that the austerity policies imposed by 
the European authorities and the IMF have produced a severe and lasting downturn in the economy 
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(Cline, 2013). So the only desiderable and correct solution for Greece is to favor its growth (De 
Grauwe,  2013,  Schilirò,  2012,  2013).  Carfì  and  Schilirò  have  already  suggested a strategy based on 
coopetition   to   find   feasible   solutions   to   overcome   the   Greek   crisis   (Carfì,   Schilirò,   2011).   In   the  
present  model,   like   in   other   coopetitive  models  we   already   developed   (Carfì,   Schilirò,   2011,   2012,  
2013), we provide a coopetitive win-win solution, a situation in which each agent (the Greece, on one 
side, and the SNC, on the other) cooperate and compete at the same time, taking into account the 
divergent interests of the two sides, and in which both sides gain. In this paper, more specifically, we 
propose a new coopetitive model where the coopetitive (shared) variables are the exports of goods and 
services from Greece to countries of the euro area in surplus (SNC) and the FDI from SNC to Greece. 
Regarding the exports of Greece towards SNC, this strategy can alleviate the trade deficit of the Greek 
economy. As far as the latter variable (FDI), Greece, by receiving inward investment, will improve its 
competitiveness and gains in terms of an increase in productive capacity, determined by a shift in the 
aggregate supply. The Greek economy will also experience an increase in the aggregate demand, with 
a greater production and the creation of new jobs. A very important effect of FDI is that home 
producers in Greece will have access to the latest technology from abroad with positive externalities 
on   the  production  system;;  moreover   there  will  be  a  positive  effect  on   the  country’s  capital  account,  
since FDI represents an inflow (credit) on the capital account. Finally, there will be less need to import 
because goods are produced in the domestic economy. All this will concur to affect positively the 
competitiveness of the Greek economy, favoring the stability and growth in Greece and, in turn, 
benefiting the whole euro area. The present model is based on the notion of coopetition 
(Branderburger, Nalebuff, 1995, 1996; Bengtsson, Kock, 1999, 2000; Luo, 2007; Padula, Dagnino, 
2007). It provides a game theory framework that offers a set of possible solutions in a coopetitive 
context allowing us to find bargaining Pareto solutions in a win-win scenario. We already devised a 
coopetitive model at a macroeconomic level in which we had developed a coopetitive game by 
excluding  the  mutual  influence  of  the  actions  (or  strategies)  for  the  two  players  (Carfì,  Schilirò,  2011).  
This choice has allowed us to greatly simplify the model; secondly it has highlighted the coopetitive 
aspect, although at the expense of the classical feature of game theory. Later we developed other 
models  (Carfì,  Schilirò,  2012,  2013)  where we have taken into account of this mutual influence, as in 
the present model we are going to describe. 
3. The coopetitive model 
In this paper, we develop and apply the new mathematical model of a coopetitive game - 
introduced in Game Theory for the first  time  by  David  Carfì  and  already  adopted  by  Carfì  and  Schilirò  
(2011, 2012, 2012a, 2013) in different contexts. The model introduced in this paper requires technics 
and  competences  adopted  and  pointed  out  in  Carfì  (2009),  Carfi,  Musolino  (2011,  2012,  2012a, 2013, 
2014)  and  Carfì,  Ricciardello  (2010,  2012,  2013)  and,   from  a  algorithmic  point  of  view,  in  Agreste,  
Carfì,  Ricciardello   (2012),  Carfì,  Ricciardello   (2010,  2012,  2013).  Furthermore,  we  desire   to  notice  
that  the  Brandenburgher  and  Nalebuff’s  idea of coopetitive game is mainly used, in a mostly intuitive 
and non-formalized way, in Strategic Management Studies. Let us begin with our basic assumptions. 
Assumption 1. Our first hypothesis is that SNC must stimulate the aggregate demand to re-
balance their trade surplus in favor of Greece. Moreover, we assume that - in agreement with the 
Greek Government - they will invest in innovative and efficient technologies in Greece. 
Assumption 2. The second hypothesis is that Greece, a country with a huge public debt, 
unsustainable to deficit/GDP and low productivity is forced by external authorities to undertake 
austerity measures and, since the country needs to get the equilibrium of its trade balance, it agrees to 
increase its exports primarily towards SNC. 
Assumption 3. The coopetitive model we propose hereunder must be interpreted as a 
normative model, in the sense that: 
 it imposes some clear and a priori conditions to be respected, by binding contracts, in order 
to enlarge the possible outcomes of both countries; 
 consequently, it shows appropriate win-win strategy solutions, chosen by considering both 
competitive and cooperative behaviors, simultaneously; 
 finally, it proposes appropriate fair divisions of the win-win payoff solutions. 
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Assumption 4. The strategy spaces of the model are: 
 the strategy set of SNC, say E, set of all possible consumptions of SNC (in our model), given 
in a conventional monetary unit. 
 the strategy set of Greece F, set of all possible reductions of public expenses of Greece (in 
our model), given in a conventional monetary unit (different from the above SNC monetary 
unit); 
 a shared strategy set C, whose elements are determined together by the two players, SNC 
and Greece, when they determine their own respective strategy sets E and F. Every strategy 
z in C is a pair (z1, z2) of monetary amounts: the first component z1 represents an amount - 
given in a third conventional monetary unit - of Greek exports imported into SNC, by 
respecting a binding contract; the second component z2 represents the amount of investments 
of SNC in Greece, by respecting a binding ex-ante agreement. 
Therefore, in the model, we assume that SNC and Greece define the set of coopetitive 
strategies. 
3.1. Strategy spaces and payoff functions 
Assumption 5. In this model, we consider a linear affine mutual interaction between SNC and 
Greece, adherent to the real state of the Euro-area. Specifically: 
 we consider an interaction between the two players also at the level of their 
non-cooperative strategies; 
 we assume that Greece also should import (by contract) some SNC 
production. 
Assumption 6. We assume that: 
 any real number x, belonging to the interval E: = [0,3], represents a possible 
consumption of SNC (given in an appropriate conventional monetary unit); 
 any real number y, in the same interval F : = E, represents aggregate austerity measures 
of Greece (given in another appropriate conventional monetary unit); 
 any real number z1, again in the interval C1 = [0,2], represents any possible amount of 
Greek exports which is imported by SNC (given in conventional monetary unit), by a 
binding ex ante agreement; 
 any real number z2, in the same interval C2 = [0,2], represents a possible investment of 
SNC (given in another appropriate conventional monetary unit). 
3.1.1 Payoff function of Surplus Northern Countries of the euro area 
We assume that the payoff function of SNC, f1, is represented by its aggregate demand: 
 f1 is equal to the consumption function C1 plus the investment function I1 plus government 
spending (that we shall assume equal 2, constant in our interaction) plus export function X1 
minus the import function M1, that is: 
 f1 = 2 + C1 + I1 + X1 −  M1. 
We assume that: 
 SNC’s  consumption  function  C1 is the first projection of the strategic coopetitive space S: = 
E2 ×  C, where the space C is the Cartesian square [0, 2]2) that is the function defined by: 
C1(x, y, z) = x, for every possible SNC consumption x in E; this because we assumed SNC’s  
consumption to be the first strategic component of strategy profiles in S; 
 the investment function I1 is constant on the space S, and by translation we can suppose I1 
equal zero; 
 the export function X1 is defined by X1(x, y, z)  =     −  y /3  −  z2 /2, for every Greek possible 
austerity measure y and for every SNC possible investment y in innovative technology in 
Greece; so we assume that the export function X1 is a strictly decreasing function with 
respect to the individual Greek strategy and the second cooperative component strategy; 
 the import function M1 is the following partial projection of the strategic space, namely 
M1(x, y, z) = z1, for every cooperative strategy z1 ∈ 2U (the notable space U is the unit 
interval [0,1]), because we assume the import function M1 depending only upon the 
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cooperative strategy z1 of the coopetitive game G, our third strategic component of the 4-
dimensional strategy profiles in S. 
Recap. We then assume as payoff function of SNC the aggregate demand f1, which in our 
model is equal, at every triple (x, y, z) in the profile strategy set S, to the sum of the strategies x,  −  z1 
with the export function X1, viewed as a reaction function to the Greece investments (so that f1 is the 
difference of the first and third projection of the strategy profile space S plus the function export 
function X1). 
Concluding, the payoff function of SNC is the function f1 of the set S into the real line R, 
defined by: f1(x, y, z) = 2 + x −  y /3  −  z1 −  z2 /2, for every triple (x, y, z) in the space S; where the 
reaction function X1, defined from the space S into the real line R by: X1(x, y, z) = −  y /3  −  z2 /2, for 
every possible investment y of Greece in the interval 3U, is the export function of SNC mapping the 
level y of Greece austerity measure and the level z2 of SNC investment in Greece into the level X1(x, y, 
z) of SNC export. 
3.1.2 Payoff function of Greece 
We assume that the payoff function of Greece f2 is again its aggregate demand: namely, 
consumption C2 plus investment I2 plus government spending (assumed to be 1) plus exports X2 minus 
imports M2); so that: 
 
f2 = 1 + C2 + I2 + X2 −  M2. 
 
We assume that: 
 the function C2 is relevant in our analysis, since we assume the Greek consumptions 
depend on the choice of the strategy austerity measure y; we assume 
 
 C2 (x, y, z) = 1 – y /3; 
 
 the function I2 : S →  R is defined by 
 
 I2(x, y, z) = z2 + n z1, for every (x, y, z) in S; 
 
 the export function X2 is the linear function defined by 
 
 X2 (x, y, z) = z1 + m z2, for every (x, y, z) in S (see above for the justification); 
 
 the function M2 is relevant in our analysis, since we assume the import function, by 
coopetitive contract with SNC, dependent on the choice of the triple (x, y, z) in S, 
specifically, we assume the import function M2 defined on the space S by M2(x, y, z): = 
−2x/3, so, Greece too, must import some SNC product, with value −2x/3 for each possible 
SNC consumption x. 
 
So, the payoff function of Greece is the linear function  f2 of the space S into the real line R, 
defined by: 
 
f2(x, y, z) = 2 – y /3  −  2x /3 + (1 + m) z2 + (1 + n) z1, for every triple (x, y, z) in the strategic 
Cartesian space S. 
 
We note that the function f2 depends significantly upon the strategies x in E, chosen by SNC, 
and that f2 is again a linear function. 
 
Assumption. We shall assume, for our specific study, the factors m and n non-negative and 
equal respectively (only for sake of simplicity) to 1 and 1/2. 
3.1.3 Payoff function of the game 
We so have build up a coopetitive gain game with payoff function f : S →  R2, given by 
f(x, y, z) = (2 + x −  y /3  −  z1 −  z2 /2, 2 – y /3 – 2 x /3 + (1 + m) z2 + (1+n) z1 ) = 
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 = (2, 2) + (x – y /3,  −  2  x /3  −  y/3) + z1 (−  1,  1  +  n) + z2 (−1/2,  1  +  m), 
for every (x, y, z) in S = [0, 3]2 ×  [0,  2]2. 
4. Study of the game G = ( f , > ) 
Note that, fixed a cooperative strategy z in (2U)2, the section-game G(z) = (p(z), >) - with 
payoff function p(z) : E2 →  R2 defined on the square E2 by: 
p(z)(x, y) := f(x, y, z),  
 
for every bi-strategy (x, y) - is the translation of the game G(0,0) by  the  “cooperative”  vector 
 
v(z) = z1 (−1,  1  +  n) + z2 (−  1/2,  1  +  m), 
 
so that, we may study the initial game G(0,0) and then we can translate the whole information 
of the game G(0,0), by the vectors v(z), to obtain the corresponding information for the game G(z) 
(each game G(z) is isometric to the initial game G(0,0)). 
4.1. Study of the initial game G(0,0) 
So, let us consider the initial game G(0,0). The strategy square E2 of G(0,0) has vertices 02, 
3e1, 32 and 3e2, where 02 is the origin of the Cartesian plane R2, e1 is the first canonical vector (1,0), 32 
is the vectors (3, 3) and e2 is the second canonical vector (0, 1). 
4.1.1 Topological Boundary of the payoff space of G(0,0) 
In order to determine the payoff space of the affine game G(0,0) it suffices to transform the 
four vertices of the strategy square (the game is an affine invertible game), because the critical zone is 
empty. 
4.1.2 Payoff space of the game G(0,0) 
So, the payoff space of the game G(0, 0) = (g, >), where the function g is the section f ((·,  ·),  
(0, 0)) is the parallelogram with vertices g(0, 0) = (2, 2), g(3, 0) = (5, 0), g(3,  3)  =  (4,  −1)  and  f (0, 3) = 
(1, 1). As we show in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Initial payoff space of the game ( f, < ). 
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4.1.3 Nash equilibria 
The unique Nash equilibrium of the initial game is the bi-strategy (3, 0). Indeed, the function 
g1 is linear and increasing with respect to the first argument; analogously, the function g2 is linear and 
decreasing with respect to the second argument. 
4.2. Study of the entire coopetitive game G = (f, >) 
4.2.1 The payoff space of the coopetitive game G 
The image of the payoff function f, is the union of the family of payoff spaces (im(pz) ) z ∈ C = 
(pz(E ×   F) ) z ∈ C, that is the convex envelope of the union of the initial payoff p0(E2) and of its 
translation by the vectors v(2, 0) and v(0, 2). The image of the coopetitive payoff function f , that is the 
payoff space of the game, is the convex envelope of the points g(0,0), g(3,0), g(3,3), g(0,3) and of their 
translations by v(2, 2), as we show in Figure 2 (first step) and in Figure 3 (second step). 
 
 
Figure 2: First dilation of the initial payoff space of the game ( f, < ). 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Payoff space of the game (f, <), with m = 1, n = 1/2. 
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4.2.2 Pareto maximal boundary of the payoff space of G 
The Pareto sup-boundary of the coopetitive payoff space f(S) is the union of the segments [A′′′, 
B′′′], [B′′′, (4, 4)] and [(4, 4), B′], see Figure 3. 
4.3. Possibility of global growth 
It is important to note that the absolute slopes of the segments [B′, (4, 4)], [(4, 4), B′′′], of the 
Pareto (coopetitive) boundary, are strictly greater than 1. Thus the collective payoff f1 + f2 of the game 
is not constant on the Pareto boundary and, therefore, the game implies the possibility of a transferable 
utility global growth. 
4.4. Trivial bargaining solutions 
The Nash bargaining solution on the entire payoff space, with respect to the infimum of the 
Pareto boundary and the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution, with respect to the infimum and the 
supremum of the Pareto boundary, are not acceptable for SNC: they are collectively (i.e., from a 
Transferable Utility point of view) better than the Nash payoff of the initial game G0 - both solutions 
belong to the Pareto segment [(4, 4), (2, 7)] - but they are disadvantageous for SNC (they suffers a 
loss, with respect to (5, 0)): these solutions could be thought as rebalancing solutions, but they are not 
realistically implementable. 
4.5. Transferable utility solutions 
In this coopetitive context it is more convenient to adopt a transferable utility solution, indeed: 
the point of maximum collective gain on the whole of the coopetitive payoff space is the point B′′′ = 
(2,7). 
4.5.1 Rebalancing win-win solution relative to maximum gain for Greece in G 
Thus we propose a rebalancing win-win coopetitive solution relative to maximum gain for 
Greece in G, as it follows (in the case m = 1): 
 we consider the portion s, of transferable utility Pareto boundary M: = (2, 7) + R(1,  −1), 
 obtained by intersecting M itself with the strip determined (spanned by convexifying) by the 
straight lines Re1 and A′′′ + R e1, these are the straight lines of Nash gain for Greece in the 
initial game G(0) and of maximum gain for Greece in G, respectively. 
 we consider the Kalai-Smorodinsky segment s′ with  vertices  (−1,  0)  - infimum of the Pareto 
boundary - and the supremum of the Pareto boundary. 
 our best payoff rebalancing coopetitive compromise is the unique point K′′′ in the inter-
section of segments s and s′. 
 
Figure 4 shows: 
•  the  above  Transferable  Utility  (TU)  Kalai-Smorodinsky solution K′′′ 
•  the  TU  Kalai-Smorodinsky solution K′′ with respect to the Nash zone. 
•  the  TU  Kalai-Smorodinsky solution K′  with respect to the Nash extreme point (4,4). 
•  the  TU  Kalai-Smorodinsky solution K with respect to the initial Nash equilibrium (4, 4). 
 
4.5.2 Win-win solution 
The payoff TU Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions K represents a win-win solutions, with respect to 
the initial Nash gain B′. So that, as we said, also SNC can increases its initial gain from coopetition. 
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Figure 4: Kalai win-win solutions of the game ( f, < ). 
 
4.5.3 Win-win strategy procedure 
The win-win payoff K can be obtained in a properly transferable utility coopetitive fashion, as 
it follows: 
 the two players agree on the cooperative strategy (2,2) of the common set C; 
 the two players implement their respective Nash strategies in the game G(2,2), so competing 
a la Nash; the unique Nash equilibrium of the game G(2,2) is the bi-strategy (3,3); 
 finally,   they   share   the   “social   pie”   (f1 + f2)(3, 3, 2, 2), in a transferable utility cooperative 
fashion (by binding contract) according to the decomposition K. 
Conclusion  
From our model we can draw some concluding remarks. First, the coopetitive game, provided 
in our contribution, is essentially a normative model. Second, our example of coopetition has pointed 
out a win-win strategy, in a transferable utility and properly coopetitive perspective, for Greece and 
SNC. Third, we propose a framework characterized by a cooperative bi-strategy based on two shared 
variables: export from Greece to SNC and FDI from SNC to Greece. 
Thus, in our model we provide: 
 properly coopetitive solutions (not convenient for SNC): Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining 
solution on the coopetitive Nash path, set of all possible Nash equilibria of the coopetitive 
interaction. 
 one transferable utility and properly coopetitive solution, convenient also for SNC and 
also rebalancing for the Euro area. 
 an extended Kalai-Smorodinsky method, appropriate to determine rebalancing partitions 
on the transferable utility Pareto boundary of the coopetitive game. 
Finally, the solutions offered in our coopetitive model aim  at  enlarging  the  “pie”  and  sharing  it  
fairly. 
In addition, they show win-win and rebalancing outcomes, for the two countries, within a 
coopetitive  game  path.  These  solutions  allow  us  to  find  “fair"  amounts  of  Greek  exports  which  SNC 
must cooperatively import, as well as the optimal amount of FDI that is necessary to improve the 
Greek economy, contributing to the growth and to the stability of both the Greek and SNC economies. 
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